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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Appellant by his appeal to this Court seeks a modification
of a supplemental order modifying decree of divorce and judgment
entered by the trial court on October 20, 1977, following two
evidentiary hearings, wherein the trial court awarded to the
Respondent the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month
as alimony and the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00)
per month per child, a total of Seven Hundred Dollars ($700.00)
per month child support for the support and maintenance of the
two minor children of the parties.

Appellant bases his challenge

on the proposition that the trial court did not, in fixing these
amounts, follow the appropriate standards and criteria announced
by this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks affirmance of the Order and Judgment of
the trial court and in addition, seeks an award of attorney's
fees in defense of the appeal and Respondent's costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of facts,
but submits such statement is not sufficiently detailed to accurately and completely reflect the circumstances of the parties
upon which the order and judgment of the trial court was made and
entered, and Respondent therefore sets out her own statement of
facts for consideration by this Court.
The parties were married on June 10, 1955 and had three (3)
children born as the issue of their marriage.

Since the commence-

ment of the divorce action below, the eldest of the parties'
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children marriedi leaving the parties' two minor sons remaining,
The Court awarded the custody of these children to the Respondent,
During the early years of the parties' marriage, the Appellar,secured an education and a degree as a medical doctor. Following
a period of residency, the Appellant practiced medicine as a
thoracic surgeon in the State of California and subsequently in
the State of Utah.
The Appellant enjoyed a successful medical practice and the
parties enjoyed a high standard of living up to 1975, when the
Appellant suffered a disability necessitating a temporary termina·
tion of his medical practice.

During 1975, the Respondent,

together with her parents, opened a small gift shop business in
Salt Lake City.

Respondent was so employed at the time of the

divorce in March of 1976. The Respondent provided for the support
of the family during the Appellant's period of disability from
her earnings from the business and loans from her parents.
In the divorce action, the lower court specifically held

~

abeyance the matter of alimony and the matter of child support to
be determined at such time as the Appellant was capable of provid;
the same and had secured gainful employment.

(R.

31 and 38)

During March of 1976, the Appellant returned to the State of
California and commenced the practice of medicine there.

On

December 30, 1976, the Respondent filed a petition for modificati:
of the Decree of Divorce for the purpose of setting and detemi~
among other things, alimony to be paid to her and child support
for the support and maintenance of the parties' minor children.
The Appellant was served with an order to show cause issued
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pursuant thereto in the State of California, but did not appear
personally at the hearing held thereon on January 14, 1977.

At

the January hearing the trial court heard evidence from the
Respondent and her accountant concerning the needs of the family,
the historical earnings of the Appellant and the parties' standard
of living prior to and following the Appellant's disability and
the arguments and statements of counsel for both parties.
53-54)

(R.

The Court ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondent the

sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month per child, a total
of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month as child support, at
the January hearing and continued the matter with respect to
alimony, additional child support and other matters to a future
date to be determined by counsel.

Apparently, the Appellant

does not challenge the evidence adduced at that hearing nor the
matters found and determined by the Court at that hearing. _!I
Thereafter on May 20, 1977, a further hearing was held with
respect to Respondent's petition, following which the trial court
filed a Memorandum Decision on May 23, 1977 (R.

71-72) and there-

after made and entered its Supplemental Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce and Judgment on October 5, 1977 (R. 94-96) from which
this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN
NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY MODIFICATION
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD
A careful review of the Appellant's brief suggests a rehash
of the same arguments submitted and made to the Trial Court at

_J/

The transcript of the testimony of the January hearing has not
been included in the record filed by the Appellant herein.
-3-
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both evidentiary hearings.
Although the consideration of alimony and child support is
regarded as a matter of equity and notwithstanding the power of
the Supreme Court to review both the law and the facts and to
make its own findings in connection therewith, this Court has
repeatedly refused to substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the Trial Court in matters of this kind.
P. 2d 514 (Utah 1976).

Eastman v. Eastman, SSc

Recognizing that the trial judge is obviou;

in the advantageous position of observing the parties and the
witnesses and hearing the evidence first hand, this Court has
previously determined that the actions of the trial Court are
indulged with a presumption of validity.
527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).

Mitchell v. Mitchell,

This presumption may only be overturn;

where an appellant sustains the burden of demonstrating that
based upon the evidence the decision of the trial court was
clearly wrong.

See, Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977).

In order to prevail, the Appellant in this case must show
first, that the evidence clearly preponderates against the finfil~
as made by the trial court; second, that there was a misunderstani
ing or misapplication of law by the trial court resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error to the appellant; or third,
that a serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 5~
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).
Although the Appellant has not specified which of the above·
listed standards his appeal is based upon, Respondent submits

-4-
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that Appellant has failed to show the Trial Court's award to be
deficient under any of such standards.
A.

The evidence presented at the trial clearly supports
the findings made and entered by the Trial Court.

1.

The Appellant states in his Brief that he disputes the

findings of the Trial Court regarding his income, and further,
that he is constrained in his ability to pay Respondent.

In

support of this proposition, Appellant recites on page 8 of his
brief the effect of applying his overhead expenses as projected
by Appellant, including the alimony and child support award to
the Respondent on Appellant's total annual income for the period
of time from April, 1976 through March, 1977 as found by the
Trial Court.

Appellant concludes that such a projection would

result in the amount of only $16, 861.00 as income remaining for
the Appellant.
Appellant does not state that his actual remaining income is

$16, 861.00, nor is Appellant requesting a reconsideration of the
award of alimony due to changed circumstances.

Instead, Appellant

appears to be suggesting that the Trial Court allocated too low a
figure in estimating Appellant's future overhead expenses.
Appellant goes on to argue that the Trial Court failed to consider
Appellant's malpractice insurance premiums in estimating Appellant's
overhead expenses and under-estimated Appellant's overhead expenses
by relying on a year when expenses were unusually low (Appellant's
Brief, pps. 7-9).
The Appellant is wrong in stating that the Trial Court
failed to consider the malpractice insurance premiums; he is also

-5-
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wrong in assuming that the Court did not consider the evidence
presented when determining Appellant's future ability to pay.
The transcript of the hearing shows that evidence was present
as to contemplated malpractice in.surance costs, increased overheac
involved in a contemplated move to a new office and increased
costs for salary already being paid to Appellant's secretary

(~.

27-29, 38-42, 44-46). This evidence of the projected overhead
expenses was received and considered by the Trial Court in reaclk
its subsequent award of alimony and child support.

Appellant

also mischaracterizes the testimony presented when he states that
the Court relied only on a year when overhead expenses were
unusually low.

Evidence presented at trial included both the

overhead expenditures for the last eight months of 1976 and the
first three months of 1977, and the projected expenses for the
remainder of the year 1977.

It should be noted that this period

of time was the total period for which figures were available,
i.e. from the beginning of Appellant's practice in California to
the hearing date.
Although Appellant states that he disagrees with the findings
of the Trial Court that his annual taxable income is $66,692.00
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2), Appellant does not specify the basis
of any such disagreement other than to state that the overhead
expenses allowed by the Court were unusually low, as discussed
above.

A review of the evidence presented at trial will substan-

tiate the Court's findings that Appellant's income on an accrual
basis for the nine month period ending December 31, 1976 was
$62,855.00 and that for the period of January through March of

-6-
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1977 the Defendant's earnings were $20,576.00 for a total income
of $83,461.00 before overhead expenses (See Exhibits P-2, P-4, p-

-s

and P-6).

While the Trial Court used an amount of twenty

percent (20%)overhead allocation, Appellant's actual overhead
expense ratio was 15.9%

(Tr. 27).

Appellant argues his inability to provide for Respondent and
the minor children of these parties at the level ordered by the
Trial Court but apparently did not feel any financial stress over
providing adequately for himself.

Notwithstanding his claims, he

was able during his first year of practice to purchase a new
automobile at a cost of $9,000.00 (Tr. 34-35); accumulate in a
personal savings account between $3,000.00 and $4,000.00 after
the payment of taxes (Tr. 34); take a trip to Hawaii at a cost of
$3,363.00 and attend another convention in San Francisco at a
cost of $900.00 (Tr. 37), plan to purchase new office furniture
and equipment for some $15,000.00 (Tr. 46) and move to a new
office (which Appellant did not anticipate would result in an
increase of his income)

(Tr. 28), all while paying for the support

of Plaintiff and the minor children of the parties in the calendar
year 1976 the total sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800. 00)

(Tr.

31).

Appellant has not shown by his argument that the evidence
presented clearly preponderates against the findings; he has only
shown that he disagrees with the result reached by the Trial
Court, a situation not in and of itself warranting reversal or
modification of the Trial court's award.
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Appellant argues that the evidence presented at

trials~~

that Respondent is capable of producing sufficient income to meet
her needs.

In support of this argument, Appellant states on page

5 of his brief that on the basis of Respondent's salary during

the first quarter of 1977, her taxable income was $20,400.00.
Appellant then questions the reliability of testimony given by
the accountant that the gift shop is not capable of paying Respond::
a salary of $20,400.00 annually based upon the income of the gift
shop for the first three months of 1977. Appellant concludes that
the gift shop's loss of $1,700.00 for the first quarter of 1977
is not unusual; that the gift shop is a "healthy" business and
that the record shows Respondent's income to be $20,400.00 per
annum or $1,700.00 per month (See, Appellant's Brief, p. 6).
Respondent disputes the conclusions reached by Appellant
regarding the testimony given by the Accountant, Mr. Ericksen.
In the first place, the accountant testified that the Respondl
salary from the gift shop in the calendar year 1976 was $11, 200.0~.
(Tr. 13)

The Accountant further testified that the Respondent

received additional cash in the amount of approximately $9,300.00
during 1976 and that the source of those funds was a draw on the
Respondent's partnership equity representing a decrease therein
plus a loss in the business during the year 1976 (Tr. 13, 14).
It can hardly be argued that a salary plus a decrease in

partne~

ship equity and a business loss for the year 1976 can be equated
to a salary payable from the business to the Respondent as argued
by the Appellant.

Apparently the Trial Court chose to believe

[,
, I

-8,I
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the testimony of Mr. Ericksen as it entered its finding that
Plaintiff's salary was in fact $11,200.00 for that year (R. 89).
During the first three months of 1977, the Respondent received
a gross salary of $5,100.00 or $1,700.00 per month, which the
accountant concluded the business could not continue to pay for
the full twelve month period of 1977.

(Tr. 15)

In fact,

it is

interesting to note that at the 1976 salary rate of $11,200.00
per year, the business lost money, i.e. $290.00

(Tr. 14)

Based

upon that evidence, the Respondent submits the Appellant seriously
mischaracterizes the economic picture of the gift shop in stating
that "this is a picture of a healthy business partnership whose
increasing earnings are being distributed, at least in Respondent's
case, in the form of a higher salary"
6).

(See Brief of Appellant, p.

It is difficult to imagine that a small business in which

the first quarter shows a loss of $1,700.00 (Tr. 16) and the
previous year reflected a loss of $290.00 can in any way be
regarded as "healthy" .
A more reasonable explanation for Respondent's high first
quarter income for 1977 lies in the fact that the business is
owned by Respondent and her parents.

And further, that Respondent's

mother works in the business without salary.

(Tr. 17, R. 89 t8).

The evidence was clear that during the period of April, 1975
to April 1976 the Appellant did not earn any income nor contribute
to the support of the Respondent and the parties' family (Tr.
23).

Fortunately, during that period the parents of the parties'

were able to provide some assistance and support (Tr. 23) and of
course, the Respondent provided the balance from income generated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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from the business.
It is certainly not the purpose of alimony to provide support
and maintenance for a party only after depletion of that party's
resources and that party's family's resources.

Respondent should

not be required to live from the proceeds of loans from her
parents, particularly during a period of time when the Appellant,
a trained thoracic surgeon, was able to provide for the support
and maintenance of his wife of over twenty years and their minor
children where the evidence is as clear as it is in this case
that Appellant's income is more than adequate to pay the alimony
and child support awarded to the Respondent by the Trial Court.
It is therefore clear that Appellant misstates the evidence
presented when he claims that Respondent has an income adequate
to meet her needs without the payment of alimony.

Instead, the

evidence presented amply supports findings of the Trial Court in
making its award.

Respondent's expenses on a monthly basis

exceed the sum of $2,300.00 per month without any repayment of
loans to Respondent's parents required by her to be paid in the
Decree of Divorce in connection with the Respondent's business
(R. 37 1112), including a loan from her parents in the sum of
$15, 000. 00 (Tr. 7).
3.

Appellant argues that the evidence does not support an

award of $350. 00 per month per child as child support.

Appellant

does not support this argument by reference to the evidence, to
any exhibit, by citation to the record or otherwise (See, Appella;:I
Brief, pp. 9, 10).
A review of the evidence presented does,

in fact,

support

the award of child support at the amount indicated and the Trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Judge, after a consideration of the testimony and all relevant
factors,

so found.

The evidence at the trial was abundantly

clear that Respondent's expenses included items for housing,
food, clothing, transportation, etc.,

a substantial portion of

which is obviously required for the support and maintenance of
the two children in Respondent's custody.

(Ex. 1-P)

The Appellant somehow suggests that the case of Anderson v.
Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946) implies that the trial
court here confused the purpose of alimony and the purpose of
child support and thereby granted Respondent a "hidden award of
alimony" in what Appellant considers excessively high child
support. In fact, in the Anderson case, there was a variance
between the findings and the decree with respect to alimony and
child support.

The Respondent submits that Anderson is totally

inapplicable to the instant case in that the trial judge here
made specific findings and conclusions with respect to both
alimony and child support (R. 91,

~/2).

The Anderson court noted

that the criterion for the determination of support money is the
need of the persons supported and the Defendant's ability to pay.
Id. at 135-136.

The trial court in this case found both a need

on the part of the minor children and that the Appellant in fact
had the ability to pay.
B.

The Trial court did not misunderstand or misapply the
law so as to create substantial prejudicial error.

Appellant argues that in deriving the amount of the alimony
award the Trial Court applied criteria inconsistent with criteria
recommended by the Utah Supreme Court.

-11-

Appellant suggests that
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the Trial Court's consideration of
. . among other things, (1) the length of
the marriage, (2) Plaintiff's assistance to
Defendant during the lean years from June, 1955 ~
1970 and during which Defendant prepared himself
for his present profession of cardiovascular
surgery and particularly, (3) the present dispu~
in the Plaintiff's and Defendant's income and the·
disparity in their income potential.
indicates that the Court did not base the award upon the correct
criteria which the Appellant argues is the financial condition
and need of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a

suff~~

income for herself and the ability of the husband to provide
support (See, Appellant's Brief p. 4).
1.

Appellant is not justified in accusing the Trial Court

of applying incorrect criteria.

In its reference to the

"prese~

disparity" in the Plaintiff's and Defendant's income and the
disparity in their income potential, the Court does base the
award on the ability of the Respondent to support herself and the'
ability of the Appellant to provide support. Obviously, when one
has a low income potential, one has a limited ability to support
oneself, whereas, when one has a high income potential, one may
have the ability to provide support for another, and in this
case, the obligation to provide such support.

In that connection,

it should be noted that in April of 1976, the first month the
Appellant reopened his medical practice in California, his rece~t:
were $100.00.

His receipts in May were $384.00, and those receipt:

increased per month to the point that in December of 1976, Appella:
receipts after fee adjustments totalled $9,325.18.
P).

(Exhibit 2-

In January of 1977, Appellant's receipts exceeded $5,800.00

(Exhibit 4-P); in February,

$5,200.00 (Exhibit 5-P) and in

March, Appellant's receipts exceeded $9,400.00 (Exhibit 6-P).
-12-
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Based upon such earnings, it can hardly be argued with convincing
force that the Appellant does not have the ability to support his
former wife and two minor children.

In view of such overwhelming

evidence, it is clear that the trial Court demonstrated in its
award that it knew and applied the criteria recommended and urged
by the Appellant and supported by numerous decisions of this
Court.
This Court recently considered "economic disparity" in the
income potential of divorced parties and noted in Ehninger v. Ehninger,
569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977), the following:
Notwithstanding all of the talk of equal rights
for women, the trial court would be justified in
taking cognizance of the commonly known fact that
in many fields of endeavor there is an unfavorable
disparity between the economic potential for women
as compared to men.
For whatever reason, there is
in fact quite a wide difference between the economic
status of these parties.
569 P.2d 1104, 1106.
Contrary to the argument advanced by Appellant that the
trial Court confused the standard appropriate to the division of
assets with the standards appropriate to awarding alimony as
proscribed in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), the trial
Court in fact followed the instructions and standards set forth
in the cases cited in English _2/ in that the amount of alimony
to be awarded is measured by the needs and requirements of the
wife, considering her station in life, and upon the husband's
ability to pay.

In Mitchell, the situation presented to this

Court was a situation where, for one year the parties' income

Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971); Hendricks
v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 559, 63 P.2d 277 (1936).

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

increased substantially and significantly and the trial court
there apparently did not consider either the Plaintiff's actual
- or potential earning ability, the effect of certain potential
rental income, nor the Defendant's historical earning situation
(noting that the Defendant's income in the previous year was
fifty percent (50%) less) and that he had experienced unusual
prosperity during the one year which the trial court used in
basing its award.

Clearly, those factors are not present in the

instant case.
Here, the Appellant was able, during his first year of the
resumption of his medical practice, to earn on an accrual basis
in excess of $83,000.00 and on a cash received basis, in excess
of $64,000.00 (R. 89, •• 5, 6).

While the Respondent's income,

without alimony, child support or a reduction in the equity of
her business was $11,200.00. (R. 89

•Bl.

Even if this Court finds that the Trial Court misunderstood
or even misapplied the law, which Respondent denies, such a
defect would not result in substantial prejudicial error to the
Appellant.

The award made by the Trial Court is equitable under

any test.

The evidence clearly substantiates the findings of the

Trial Court that Respondent has a need for alimony; Respondent
does not have the ability to produce a sufficient income for
herself and the minor children of the parties; and the Appellant
is able to provide the alimony and support awarded.
C.

No serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion by the Trial Court.

Under Utah law, when deciding questions concerning an award
of alimony or child support, the trial court has considerable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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latitude of discretion.

The findings of the Trial Court should

not be modified unless as made and entered they work such an
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion,
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977).

Since the Court's

findings are substantiated by the evidence and there is no injustice
in the award, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent respectfully requests
that the Order and Judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed and
further that the Respondent be awarded her attorney's fees in
defense of this appeal and Respondent's costs.
Respectfully submitted this ~day of January, 1978,

~-

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
12th Floor, 310 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent
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I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent Diane Olive Frank were served upon the Defendant and
Appellant, Charles Gordon Frank by mailing the same, first class
postage prepaid, to his attorney, L.E. Richardson, at his offices
at 516 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ,,,jlJl!:l
day of January, 1978.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

